> series: anatomy_of_a_breach —— part: 043 —— pattern: credential_dump_summer —— accounts_exposed: 45,000,000+ —— theme: broken_password_storage<span class="cursor-blink">_</span>_
In the weeks following the LinkedIn breach, a cascade of credential dumps hit the internet. Last.fm (43 million accounts with unsalted MD5 hashes), eHarmony (1.5 million unsalted MD5 hashes), Yahoo Voices (453,000 usernames and passwords stored in plaintext), and Formspring (420,000 salted SHA-256 hashes) all disclosed breaches within weeks of each other. Together with LinkedIn's 117 million, the summer of 2012 exposed over 160 million credentials — establishing credential theft as the dominant data breach category and credential stuffing as the dominant attack methodology for the rest of the decade.
The theme across all four breaches was identical: inadequate password storage. Last.fm used unsalted MD5. eHarmony used unsalted MD5. Yahoo Voices stored passwords in plaintext — not hashed at all. Only Formspring used salted hashes, which provided meaningful protection. The credential dump summer proved that the lessons of Gawker (2010), Sony Pictures (2011), and HBGary (2011) had not been learned — and that the internet's credential infrastructure was systemically broken.
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Free Scoping Call| Service | Accounts | Password Storage | Time to Crack |
|---|---|---|---|
| 117 million | Unsalted SHA-1 | Minutes for common passwords | |
| Last.fm | 43 million | Unsalted MD5 | Seconds with rainbow tables |
| eHarmony | 1.5 million | Unsalted MD5 | Seconds with rainbow tables |
| Yahoo Voices | 453,000 | Plaintext — no hashing | Instant — passwords readable as-is |
| Formspring | 420,000 | Salted SHA-256 | Hours to days — salt prevented rainbow tables |
The credential dump summer created an enormous pool of verified email-password combinations that attackers used for credential-stuffing attacks against corporate systems, banking platforms, and cloud services for years afterwards. The lesson is simple: if your users reuse passwords (and most do), then a breach at any service they use is effectively a breach of your service too — unless you have deployed multi-factor authentication.
MFA — now a Cyber Essentials Danzell auto-fail criterion — is the only reliable defence against credential stuffing. Dark web monitoring through SOC in a Box alerts you when your users' credentials appear in breach datasets. Our web application testing verifies password storage security and MFA implementation. And UK Cyber Defence provides incident response when credential compromise leads to account takeover.
<a href="https://www.socinabox.co.uk">SOC in a Box</a> monitors for your credentials in breach databases. <a href="/cyber-essentials">Cyber Essentials</a> mandates MFA. Our <a href="/penetration-testing/web-application">application testing</a> verifies your password storage. Because if your users' LinkedIn, Last.fm, or eHarmony passwords are the same as their corporate passwords, you have been breached too.
We'll scope your test for free and tell you exactly what you need. No obligation, no hard sell.
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